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Critical business processes can fail. Therefore, continuity processes are needed as back-up solutions.
Today, those continuity processes are set up and maintained manually. They are mostly based
on best-practices that focus on specific continuity scenarios. Nevertheless, failures can occur in
new and unforeseen combinations. As a consequence, a given business continuity plan needs to
handle such situations as well. For this purpose, we present a technique for the generation and
validation of the universe of continuity processes given a critical business process at Credit Suisse.
The presented approach uses a combination of formal methods in the area of algebraic graph
transformation and process algebra encompassing modal logic. The overall approach prepares for a
sound evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of such plans. It uses formal tools, not standard
software engineering solutions, to benefit from formal guarantees that facilitate the implementation
of local and global security requirements.
ACM Classification: C.3 Special-Purpose and Application-based Systems (Process control sys-
tems), G.2.3 Applications, I.6.4 Model Validation and Analysis, I.6.5 Model Development
Keywords and Phrases: business continuity, business process, algebraic graph transformation,
process algebra, generation, evaluation, enterprise modeling
1 Introduction
Given a business process model in a domain specific modeling language together with security
and continuity rules, the problem addressed in this paper is how to set up and determine a
continuity plan in the organizational context at Credit Suisse, which can be evaluated regarding
its effectiveness and efficiency. The research question is how to give an answer to continuity
issues of the bank that is sound and compatible with a decentralized organization which is a
hard organizational side-constraint. The scope of this study is to show how to model a simplified
version of a real-world business process and continuity situations compatible with these real-world
requirements in order to derive all possible process variants and continuity processes that match
security rules. It prepares for the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of a continuity plan
that is left for future work.
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The novelty presented consists of a combination and conceptual integration of fully imple-
mented formal methods – in contrast to standard software engineering solutions – that can be
used in a transparent way to address business continuity issues regarding critical business pro-
cesses at Credit Suisse by using declarative formal techniques. This paper extends the concepts
and results presented in (Brandt, Hermann, and Engel 2009a) concerning the analysis of busi-
ness processes and the generation of validated process variants for business continuity. The first
main contribution consists of applying the formal technique of algebraic graph transformation to
generate the universe of continuity processes given a critical business process and its continuity
snippets. In addition to what have already shown in (Brandt et al. 2009a), we present here how
the generation of process variants is executed based on a derived formal process model (Corradini,
Hermann, and Sobocin´ski 2008). The graph technique helps to ensure local security requirements
by declarative rules. The second main contribution that has not been shown in (Brandt et al.
2009a) consists of demonstrating how the formal technique of algebraic graph transformation is
used to realize a model transformation by the help of triple graph grammars to derive an mCRL2
model representing a possible denotational semantics for the given EPC. This mCRL2 model is
further used to check for global security properties of the business process.
This paper is organized as follows: Firstly, the notion of business continuity is introduced as it is
discussed in the literature and practiced at Credit Suisse. Secondly, modeling business continuity
processes is put in the context of a modeling framework. Thirdly, a simplified real-world loan
granting process is introduced as a typical example of a critical business process. It is presented as
a human-centric business process model. Here, it is demonstrated how a variant of an event driven
process chain together with a set of continuity snippets can serve as a means to derive all possible
process variants as well as corresponding continuity processes that respect given local security
side-constraints. Fourthly, as a formal technique to generate all possible continuity processes a
reconstructed graph grammar is introduced. Fifthly, it is shown how model transformation based
on algebraic graph transformation can be used to create an mCRL2 model as a machine-centric
business process model that is going to be used to check for its global data-flow and information-
flow properties of the business process at stage. Finally, some selected pointers of related work
are discussed based on relevant requirements that came out of the banking scenario. Because of
the size of the models the specification of the graph grammars as well as the mCRL2 model
encompassing its evaluation are presented in the online version of the corresponding technical
report (Brandt, Hermann, and Groote 2010a).
2 Business Continuity
Business Continuity (BC) is introduced here according to the British Standard (BS) 25999-1:2006
and the BS 25999-2:2007 (Zalewski, Sztandera, Ludzia, and Zalewski 2008, Boehmer 2009) by
taking two different perspectives: the first one is based on the current scientific literature and
industrial practice, the second one is based on concrete requirements of Credit Suisse that came
up during this study.
From the point of view of scientific literature and industrial practice BC addresses questions of
how to handle risk issues in the case that critical business processes of an organization fail (Cassel
2005). Historically, BC addressed IT processes, later on, business processes came up as the final
purpose of their supporting IT processes (Zambon, Bolzoni, Etalle, and Salvato 2007, Asnar and
Giorgini 2008). BC addresses the risk that a company may go out of business because a process
is not up and running. Creating a continuity plan is a long-term process and companies should
review the existing documentation as an ongoing project (Kepenach 2007, Lam 2002). However,
continuity plans are quite often just textual documents, which limit possible analysis techniques,
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such that a full assessment would require the real execution of a plan or its parts. In the case that
modeling techniques are used they often do not match the underlying organizational requirements
and they are not sufficiently formalized (Zalewski et al. 2008). Regarding IT, service continuity
management (SCM) forms one of the management modules in daily IT service management in
the IT Infrastructure Library Service Delivery (Stych and Zeppenfeld 2008, Wan 2008). One
important quality of SCM is that failures can be fixed within the Maximum Tolerable Period of
Disruption (MTPD) (Zambon et al. 2007). BC is not only relevant for large organizations but
also for mid-sized ones as caused due to recent changes in legislation such as HIPPA (Landry and
Koger 2006a). The Chartered Management Institute indicated that loss of IT capacity and loss of
telecommunications are the main incidents that cause a business disruption (Helms, Van Oorschot,
Herweijer, and Plas 2006).
From the point of view of Credit Suisse BC is just one organizational task that has to be
integrated with others as there is a need to implement and manage security, risk and compliance
requirements in the broader context of enterprise modeling (Brandt, Hermann, and Engel 2009c).
All these activities require organizational models like the description of services, processes and
rules. However, by today, there is little reuse of such models between the groups responsible
for the different areas. As a consequence, results have a low maturity, they are neither soundly
integrated nor synchronized and they are not up-to-date with the evolving organization as well
as organizational regulations. This situation leads to severe quality problems and high costs.
For example, because of the lack of integration, there is no guarantee that business continuity
processes respect the security requirements (Quirchmayr 2004). So, a central motivation of Credit
Suisse is to look at BC from a holistic organizational perspective (Asnar and Giorgini 2008)
and not, as by today, from a bouquet of non-integrated codes of practices derived from external
regulations as e.g. Basel II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006) or the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (United States Code 2002). We will address this issue by providing a modeling framework for
an organization like the one of Credit Suisse that can integrate BC as one technique among others
in a compatible way. The second motivation of Credit Suisse is to enforce automation to reduce
daily costs. We will address this by looking at implementable formal methods that can be used
in a declarative way. In detail, Credit Suisse expects processes to be documented by the help of
some event-driven process chain (EPC), as discussed in (Zalewski et al. 2008), and that back-up
solutions for business continuity can be provided by local process fragments – we like to call them
snippets – that can be provided by different people compatible with the decentralized nature of the
organization. Based on the process description and the available continuity snippets the universe
of continuity processes should be created automatically (van der Aalst, Dumas, Gottschalk, ter
Hofstede, Rosa, and Mendling 2008). Finally, Credit Suisse likes to evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency of continuity plans in a methodological and tool supported way. Therefore, it is vital to
implant proactive, self-managed systems that ensure continuous operations and, therefore, business
continuity (Zambon et al. 2007).
3 Enterprise Modeling
In the context of this study we will build our solution on top of a framework for small, inde-
pendent and decentralized as well as lean organizational models. We apply the formal technique
of algebraic graph transformation to build, change, integrate, transform and synchronize these
models using their underlying abstract syntax graphs. In this way the technique covers a wide
range of domain specific languages. Graph transformation provides a declarative approach and
the execution as well as analysis can be automated. We propose to realize this by the help of a
graph transformation engine as a new type of base-system like there are databases or workflow
engines available today (Braatz and Brandt 2010). This allows us to provide a framework (Brandt
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et al. 2009c) for model integration, transformation and synchronization, which additionally – as
a by-product – offers the generation of the universe of business continuity processes based on a
given business process together with its continuity snippets. We believe that, by doing this, a max-
imum of functional reuse of a graph transformation engine will be possible, such that the overall
costs of a holistic solution are reduced. We further believe that the use of the same technique for
different purposes substantially improves the integration of different methodologies in comparison
to today’s highly focussed products that handle security, risk and compliance issues of enterprise
models implementing best-practices non-homogeneously.
In detail, the new framework for enterprise modeling as shown in Fig. 1 tries to be as close as
possible at people’s perceptions of organizational structures in the field. From the point of view of
conceptual domain languages, IT experts at Credit Suisse like to think in service models, whereas
business experts are primarily focussed on processes. In addition to that, compliance groups pre-
fer rule sets. Furthermore, the organizational knowledge is distributed in the organization and for
this reason, we propose that experts can directly provide their codified knowledge as fragments of
organizational service, process and rule models. The formal techniques of algebraic graph trans-
formation which we assume to be implemented as a graph transformation engine will support the
integration of these fragments organized by the modeling framework towards one holistic view in
an automated or semi-automated way.
Business 
Universe
IT Universe
Human
Centric
Concepts
Machine
Centric
Concepts
Services Processes Rules
(H,B,S)
(H,I,S) (H,I,P) (H,I,R)
(H,B,R)(H,B,P)
Fig. 1 Holistic Enterprise Modeling Framework for Services, Processes and Rules
However, conceptual domain languages are often not fully formalized and they are by their deep
nature inherently evolving over time. For this reason they are not suitable for fully automated
evaluation techniques like model checking, despite the fact that they offer a high degree of usability.
In contrast to that fully implemented formal methods like first-order logic or process algebra are
very suitable for such techniques. However, people in the field do not feel comfortable to work
with them. Therefore, we believe that the dominant strategy will be to get the best out of both
worlds by combining them and claim that it is necessary to use both, on the one hand human-
centric organizational models and on the other hand machine-centric organizational models. They
are formally integrated, synchronized and transformed using their abstract syntax by the help
of algebraic graph transformation techniques. Requirements of the real-world scenario at Credit
Suisse show that it is promising to work with a set of flexible integration rules that are best suited
to realize a loose coupling between human-centric and machine-centric models, so that domain
languages can still evolve even when implemented formal methods do not change.
In order to support a sound alignment between organizational models of IT and business
departments the same types of models – namely organizational service, process and rule models –
are used for both universes. This directly shows the need for IT experts at Credit Suisse to model
their processes as well as for business experts to codify their business services. It further makes
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clear that compliance groups need to focus their rule sets properly towards either business or IT
models, which is not the case today. The practice at Credit Suisse shows that there is no clear
top-down or bottom-up relationship between business and IT models but a relationship between
equals, which contradicts assumptions of enterprise modeling techniques used at Credit Suisse.
The scope of this paper within this modeling framework is to show how a business process
given by a human-centric business process model can be used as the input for algebraic graph
techniques in order to generate all possible variants respecting the inherently defined data-flow
dependencies. Once, continuity snippets are given that show how to back up certain failures in the
given business process, the set of continuity processes can be generated using these techniques.
Finally, given the human-centric business process models we will sketch how to apply model
transformation techniques to create machine-centric process models based on process algebra
with the overall purpose in mind to check for data-flow and information-flow qualities the graph
techniques cannot test because they only check local properties of models. The following figure
(Fig. 2) shows which section of the model framework we are going to address in this paper.
Machine centric Business Process Models
Human centric Business Process Models Analysis
Analysis
In
te
g
ra
tio
n
 &
 
S
yn
ch
ro
n
iz
a
tio
n
M
o
d
e
l 
T
ra
n
sf
o
rm
a
tio
n(M,B,P)
(H,B,P)
type
type
TG
S
TG
C
TG
T
t TG
s T
G
Fig. 2 Scope of the Paper
As visualized in Fig. 2, we consider machine-centric (M,B, P ) and human centric business
process models (H,B, P ). The applied techniques are based on the underlying abstract syntax
graph of each model. In order to perform a model transformation from human centric business
models (EPCs) to machine-centric business process models (mCRL2 ) we distinguish between the
type graph TGS for the source language and TGT for the target language. Model transformation
as well as integration and synchronization are performed using the triple graph transformation
approach (Schu¨rr 1994) as presented in (Brandt et al. 2009a, Ehrig, Ermel, Hermann, and Prange
2009). This way the type graph TGS is connected with the type graph TGT via a correspondence
type graph TGC and the connecting graph morphisms sTG : TG
C → TGS and tTG : TGC → TGT
as shown in Fig. 2. The concrete correspondences depending on certain substructures are defined
by triple rules in the form of intuitive patterns showing how an already integrated model would
evolve.
4 A Loan Granting Process
In the context of this paper we will use a simplified loan granting process as it is used by Credit
Suisse in the daily business. The process model is shown in Fig. 3 as a human-centric business pro-
cess model given by a variant of an event-driven process chain (EPC) (Scheer 2001). We use EPCs
because Credit Suisse requested to use existing business process models that already have been
created in the past for different purposes. From the point of view of Credit Suisse this simplified
loan granting process is critical and several failures can occur. Here, we focus on the availability of
organizational agents and IT applications. We will show how additional process fragments, called
continuity snippets, can be used to generate and provide back-up solutions, where parts of the
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standard process are replaced by the snippets. The snippets can be kept small and simple. They
are automatically combined by the graph technique to more sophisticated constructions later on.
Based on this process model Sect. 5 presents how the universe of process variants handling differ-
ent combinations of failures can be generated, where also the equivalent reorderings of the steps
are computed. We show how declarative functional requirements and security requirements are
ensured during the generation – something, which is currently not manageable by hand, and which
is therefore missing in today’s practice at Credit Suisse.
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The loan granting process is presented by an extended EPC. We use organizational entities like
people and applications once at the right side as agents that execute certain business functions
and we use them at the same time at the left side as possible sources and sinks of data-flows going
into and coming out of business functions. This way, data-flow dependencies become explicit and
process variants can be generated based on these dependencies. Furthermore, a buffer for flowing
data is made explicit and visualized by boxes between these elements. We assume that such a
buffer is managed by a workflow engine. To make clear which parts of the process are executed
by such an engine and which are executed by hand, boxes have either a thick or a dashed line.
This allows us to cover automated and non-automated parts of a business process by one single
human-centric business process model as it was requested by Credit Suisse. The data which is
cached by a workflow engine can be reused if needed. We will call this extended EPC a workflow
engine based and data-flow oriented EPC, in short: WDEPC (Brandt et al. 2009a).
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Fig. 4 Alternative Continuity Snippet “Rating Customer” (1 of 16 simple snippets) and Part of the Alternative Workflow
While the given process model shows a fixed order of certain functions, many of them are not
directly dependent on each other. But they are partly dependent on the data that is produced by
previous steps. Look e.g. at functions “F1” to “F4” for getting and storing certain customer data.
Clearly, “F1” needs to be executed before “F3” and similarly “F2” before “F4”, but there are
no further dependencies. Thus, leaving out the synthetical events in between we are interested in
all permutations of such steps fulfilling the data dependencies to generate valid process variants.
However, there are some specific events like “E8”, “E9” or “E14” which restrict possible permu-
tations in the sense that they play the role of a boundary functions which cannot be passed when
moving up or down. Critical parts of the workflow are e.g. at functions “F10” where the contract is
signed by the relationship manager and “F12” where the contract is approved by the credit officer.
Here, the four-eye principle applies as a security requirement and demands that these functions
have to be performed by two different persons. For this reason, the continuity processes have to
ensure this requirement, too. It can be codified as a graph constraint as will be shown in Sect. 5.1.
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In Fig. 4 a continuity snippet is presented for the function rating customer (F6). If the rating
application that executes the business function becomes unavailable the process fragment that
starts with the business event credit worthiness computed (E6) and ends with the business event
rating computed (E7) can be replaced by the continuity snippet where the customer officer will
execute the business function rating customer (F6(C)) as a back-up solution. This approach di-
rectly came up based on organizational requirements at Credit Suisse where knowledge about
continuity scenarios is not necessarily provided by the same people that manage the standard
business process and where knowledge is distributed among different persons. Our approach based
on continuity snippets supports such a scenario because it can be codified in a declarative way by
different people, collected and integrated as well as updated. The corresponding technical report
(Brandt et al. 2010a) shows the generated graph grammar specifying the operational semantics
consisting of 17 transformation rules as well as the complete set of 16 continuity snippets for this
process model.
5 Generation of Business Continuity Processes
At Credit Suisse continuity plans are defined only for certain fixed scenarios at a macro level. Even
so, there are lots of small failures in such a scenario. That leads to problems when more than one
continuity scenario is going to come up at the same time, or when failures that are assigned to
different scenarios mix up in a new scenario. In addition to that Credit Suisse’s continuity plans
are to a large extent not operational but need to be instantiated towards a concrete situation. That
makes it impossible to check their effectiveness and efficiency. Because continuity processes based
on a given continuity plan are created ad-hoc at the bank their effectiveness and efficiency cannot
be evaluated either. So, Credit Suisse knows very little about the quality of its own continuity
procedures, which drives insurance costs.
By looking at the human-centric business process model of the presented loan granting process
we like to show how to address these problems in a methodological way. In contrast to Credit
Suisse’s approach which is top-down, we go bottom-up by defining continuity snippets for the
presented business process. A second difference is that Credit Suisse’s approach is static, which
means it only addresses one very specific scenario, whereas ours is flexible and can address a wide
range of different scenarios by applying continuity snippets to emerging failures in unforeseen ways
by the people in the field. A third difference is that Credit Suisse’s approach does not scale well, it
always requires to execute the whole continuity plan, whereas our approach can dynamically focus
on very specific parts of a scenario. It only needs to apply continuity snippets that are linked to
concrete failures, not to whole scenarios. Therefore, we use the snippets as well as security rules
like the one for the four-eye principle to generate the universe of business continuity processes
given the universe of all functional valid process variants. Once this universe is available single
continuity processes as well as the whole set can be checked regarding their effectiveness and
efficiency. We will focus on the generation of valid process variants as well as possible continuity
processes. The check for their effectiveness and efficiency is left for future work.
5.1 Analysis of Dependencies and Constraints
The first step for the generation of business continuity processes is the analysis of existing depen-
dencies between the single steps of a process. Here, we focus on data-flow dependencies between
functions. We therefore remove the dependencies caused by the syntactic events between the func-
tions and only keep specific event-dependencies, which are marked as e.g. “E14” or which are used
for a control structure as e.g. “E8” and “E9”. This analysis allows for possible process paths that
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show a different order of the steps and possibly enable the exchange of certain parts with con-
tinuity fragments that were not possible in the standard order. Furthermore, the process is kept
flexible which improves the usability for the actors assuming that the execution of the process is
supported by a workflow engine.
The analysis of the dependencies is performed by reconstructing a specific kind of graph gram-
mar from the given WDEPC together with the continuity snippets as presented in (Brandt et al.
2009a, 2010a). This reconstruction can be performed automatically. The used underlying abstract
syntax of WDEPC models can be automatically created during the modeling phase by e.g. using
a visual editor that is generated by the Tiger environment (Biermann, Ermel, Lambers, Prange,
and Taentzer 2010, Tiger Project Team 2009) based on a graph grammar specification. Further-
more, we can define the functional requirements as an additional graph rule, by stating which data
elements have to be created in the process for a certain combination of events. In the presented
example we have the requirement that either the customer is not accepted or the contract shall
be approved and a closing date has to be set.
CP
ApproveContract : Function
graph constraint: samePerson
RMSignature : Function
 : Actor
ApproveContract : Function
RMSignature : Function :toF
:toF
:(samePerson)
graph constraint:
 4EyePrinciple
Fig. 5 Security Requirement: “the 4-eye principle”
Security constraints have to be respected by all possible process variants. As an important
example we illustrate the handling of the four-eye principle specified by the constraint in Fig. 5.
The functions “RM Signature (F10)” and “Approve Contract (F12)” have to be performed by
different persons in order to ensure that core decisions are made by at least two persons. The
graph constraint is given by a negation of the formal constraint “samePerson”, which states the
following: If the premise P is fulfilled, then also the conclusion graph C has to be found, i.e. in
this case the two functions are executed by the same person as specified by the connecting edges.
And indeed, the complete example with all continuity snippets can lead to a situation where the
four-eye principle is not respected. There are several continuity snippets for these functions and
in the case that both the relationship manager and the credit officer are temporarily unavailable,
there is one combination of snippets where both actors are replaced by the credit advisor. The
technique for the generation of continuity processes ensures the four-eye principle by checking the
graph constraint on-the-fly. Moreover, nested graph constraints have been shown to be equivalent
to first order logic expressions on graphs. Credit Suisse requested security requirements to be
modeled in such a declarative way.
In the next step a Petri net is generated from the constructed grammar as presented in (Her-
mann, Corradini, Ehrig, and Ko¨nig 2010). Petri nets are a fundamental concept for specifying
concurrent systems and provide efficient analysis techniques. The generated net purely specifies
the dependencies between the process functions and is used to generate the universe of the business
process variants and the possible continuity processes.
5.2 Generated Universe of Continuity Processes
Once the process model given by a WDEPC is analyzed as described above, the reachability graph
of the derived dependency net can be generated, where functional as well as security requirements
are respected in the way that steps that violate the security requirements are not performed and
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paths that finally do not fulfill the functional requirements are filtered out. This way, the universe
of valid process paths is generated as shown in Fig. 6. Graph techniques are well suited to check
for local requirements and we show in Sect. 6 how a machine-centric business process model based
on process algebra is generated out of the given WDEPC and checked for global requirements like
data-flow and information-flow aspects.
The first graph in Fig. 6 shows the possible paths of the standard process in Fig. 3, where the
middle node represents the starting point. Each arrow in the graph represents one step. At first,
there are two choices for executing a function, namely, either the relationship manager records
the customer identity or the customer demand. In any case the next step can be the retrieval of
the other data or the storage of the already recorded data. This flexibility is not directly present
in the WDEPC model, but by leaving out the syntactic events that fix the order of the steps, we
derive this user-friendly flexibility.
The overall amount of possible sequences of the standard process is 126. All those sequences
are semantically equivalent with respect to the given functional requirements. The second graph
(from left) shows the last 6 functions including the loop at function “F14” leading to 7 steps for
each path. Here again, there are two possibilities at the beginning: either the relationship manager
signs the contract first or the customer. Usually the relationship manager will sign first, but there
might also be few cases in which this is not the case because of time constraints of the customer.
Finally, we derive 6 functional valid sequences for this part of the workflow.
The graphs on the right hand side of Fig. 6 show the additional continuity process paths that
are possible using one or more continuity snippets for the functions “RM Signature (F10)” and
“Approve Contract (F12)”. The involved actors may be unavailable and the functions can be
replaced using some of the continuity snippets given in (Brandt et al. 2010a). These functions
have to respect the four-eye principle as discussed at the end of Sect. 5.1 before. Indeed, there is a
combination of snippets in which both actors are replaced by the credit advisor. For this reason,
the generation checks the security constraint shown in Fig. 5 on-the-fly and provides only the valid
sequences. The amount of additional continuity paths is 252 and for the last 6 functions of the
workflow part there are 12 additional paths.
There are certain advantages having all variants of the business process and its corresponding
continuity processes generated. Firstly, in case of an emergency the Credit Suisse management
can look at different options and make informed decisions which is not possible today. This leads
to some sort of recommender service. Secondly, by having all continuity processes generated, con-
tinuity plans at Credit Suisse can be checked regarding their effectiveness and efficiency leading to
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better optimized continuity plans. We can imagine to use Monte-Carlo simulations regarding the
failures in a business process given its corresponding continuity snippets. Thirdly, given the dif-
ferent snippets and side-constraints the universe of process variants and corresponding continuity
processes can be generated beforehand making it possible for a workflow engine to react without
any delay towards upcoming failures. So, this approach is compatible with real-time requirements
that are showing off in certain financial transactions at Credit Suisse. Fourthly, the business pro-
cess model and its corresponding continuity snippets can be stored separately, which reduces the
complexity of process models and supports ideally the bank’s decentralized modeling workflows.
It further makes the administration of enterprise models more intuitive.
6 Evaluation of Business Processes
In order to evaluate global properties of the human-centric business process model of the loan
granting process shown in Fig. 3 we transform it into a machine-centric business process model
formulated in mCRL2 (Groote, Mathijssen, Reniers, Usenko, and van Weerdenburg 2008), which
provides in this way a formal and denotational semantics for WDEPCs (see (Brandt et al. 2010a)
for the full translation). The model transformation is based on triple graph transformation (Ehrig
et al. 2009, Brandt, Hermann, and Engel 2009b) – a special kind of algebraic graph transformation.
This allows to declaratively specify by triple rules how certain structures in the abstract syntax of
the human-centric business process model are mapped towards structures in the abstract syntax
of the machine-centric business process model.
6.1 Machine-Centric Business Process Model
A machine-centric business process model captures very specific qualities of the given business
process in order to enable global checks by keeping its overall state space small. Therefore, there
may be more than one mCRL2 model needed depending on the purpose in mind as it can be
seen in (Boehmer, Brandt, and Groote 2009) where an mCRL2 model for a business process is
presented to simulate timing behavior. Figure 7 shows an WDEPC fragment and its corresponding
mCRL2 fragment, derived by the model transformation for data-flow checks between agents.
Data 
collected
CuID, 
Address, 
CV
ID Data 
stored
CuID, 
Address, 
CV
F3
Store ID Data
(costs, time)
RM
(availability)
DB1
(availability)
RM
(availability)
E3
E4
proc E3=
         F2_E3_r.Data_collected.E3_F3_s.E3;
proc F3=
         E3_F3_r.
         send(CuID,RM,CACHE).send(CuID,CACHE,F3).
         drop(CuID,CACHE).send(Address,RM,CACHE).
         send(Address,CACHE,F3).drop(Address,CACHE).
         send(CV,RM,CACHE).send(CV,CACHE,F3).
         drop(CV,CACHE).Store_ID_Data.
         send(CuID,F3,RM).send(Address,F3,RM).
         send(CV,F3,RM).send(CuID,F3,CACHE).
         send(CuID,CACHE,DB1).send(Address,F3,CACHE).
         send(Address,CACHE,DB1).send(CV,F3,CACHE).
         send(CV,CACHE,DB1).F3_E4_s.F3;
proc E4=
        F3_E4_r.ID_data_stored.E4_F4_s.E4;
Fig. 7 Model transformation from a WDEPC-fragment to an mCRL2 code snippet
Here, the business events “E3”, “E4” and the function “F3” are mapped towards the process
variables “E3”, “F4” and “E4”. The data-flow between the process variables is realized by send
actions in the mCRL2 code visible in Fig. 7. Drop actions show that data-items are forgotten by
the cache of the workflow engine.
6.2 Model Transformation using Triple Rules and derived Forward Rules
Because the people in the field do not want to touch the mCRL2 specification directly, we like to
show how it can be derived by model transformation without human intervention. For this purpose
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Fig. 8 Mapping the edge between a function and an event to mCRL2 code by a triple graph rule
we present one triple graph rule in Fig. 8 that demonstrates how a directed edge between a business
function and a business event in the WDEPC model is translated into two lines of mCRL2 code.
This is done by showing how a source and a target model can be constructed simultaneously by
associating construction steps at both sides by the help of connection nodes. Therefore, a triple
graph rule consists of a source, a target and a connection component. Here, it is presented in its
compact notation, which means that elements annotated with “++” are added after matching
the elements without annotation to the already existing graphs of the abstract syntax of models
at both sides. So, after matching the function and event nodes and their associated nodes for
process variables, the directed edge is added in the source model and two lines of mCRL2 code
are added in the target model as well as the edges that link these lines to the nodes of the
corresponding process variables. In order to keep the rules clear and simple for this presentation
this model transformation produces the abstract syntax of an intermediate model that can directly
be translated into mCRL2 . The boxes represent certain types and their corresponding attributes.
So, given the name and number of a function and of an event as well as the number and name of
the matched process variables, the two new mCRL2 lines can be constructed and stored in the
corresponding value attribute. Their pre-defined rank specifies that the set of generated lines by
all triple graph rules will finally be placed in the right order.
6.3 Data-Flow and Information-Flow Evaluations
Once, the application of forward rules derived from the given triple rules to the abstract syntax
of the human-centric process model results in the corresponding machine-centric process model,
we can model-check it in order to determine whether the credit advisor is able to know the data
containing the address of the customer (cf. (Groote et al. 2008)). This is checked by the help of
the modal logic formula in Fig. 9, which states that the credit advisor cannot know the address,
and this condition is evaluated to true when applied to the mCRL2 specification coming out
of the model transformation for data-flow evaluations. More precisely, the formula maintains a
set of knowledge knowledge set consisting of pairs of which datastring is known by who. E.g.
pair(Address, CA) in knowledge set expresses that the address string is known by the credit
advisor CA. When data is generated (generate) or sent (send) it becomes known to more parties,
1 nu X(knowledge_set:Set(LocatedKnowledge)={}).!(val(pair(Address,CA) in knowledge_set)) &&
2 (forall d:DataString, s:Store.[generate(d,s)] X(AddInformation(d,s,knowledge_set))) &&
3 (forall d:DataString, s:Store.[drop(d,s)] X(knowledge_set)) &&
4 (forall d:DataString, s1,s2:Store.[send(d,s1,s2)] X(AddInformation(d,s2,knowledge_set))) &&
5 [(forall d:DataString, s:Store.!generate(d,s)) &&
6 (forall d:DataString, s:Store.!drop(d,s)) &&
7 (forall d:DataString, s1,s2:Store.!send(d,s1,s2))] X(knowledge_set)
Fig. 9 Specification in mCRL2 for “credit advisor cannot know the data with the customer address”
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and hence, it is added to the knowledge set. If anything else happens to the data, such as dropping
the data from some store, the knowledge set is not changed.
Likewise, the global information flow can be checked by the help of an mCRL2 model. In-
formation is defined as an abstract object associated with given data. As such, information can
be passed to other data items when data sets are processed together while a business functions
executes. Therefore, information-flow analysis requires a specified data-flow. Our model assumes
that a certain percentage of information from one data item can be passed to another one. So,
that, at the end, we can check, how much information will be available to different agents at
different steps in the process. The model transformation and mCRL2 specification for global data-
and information-flow checks as well as a corresponding modal logic formula are given in (Brandt
et al. 2010a).
6.4 State Space of the mCRL2 model
The mCRL2 model consists of 41 parallel processes representing tasks and events. The largest
process (“F1”, Get Customer Identity) has 21 actions consisting of passing information around
and waiting for and triggering events. Atypically, there is not very much parallel behaviour as the
processes get triggered, carry out their tasks and trigger the next process. This means that the state
space is rather concise, namely only 211 states. The time to generate the states space is neglectable.
The only non trivial aspect is to eliminate the universal quantifiers in the formula in Fig. 9. After
elimination the verification of this and other modal formulae was almost instantaneous.
Create_optimized_product
Price_computed
Fig. 10 A reduced state space of the workflow showing 35 of 211 states
A state space with 211 states is already too large to visualise explicitly, but if one makes
abstractions or projections of the state space, one can get insight in almost any conceivable
behavioural aspect of it. We provide two illustrations. If we hide all actions, except task and
event names and reduce the resulting state space modulo branching bisimulation, we obtain the
state space depicted in Fig. 10, which has 35 states. The initial state is at the left-lower corner.
Transitions labelled with tau are hidden actions that determine a choice in behaviour and can
therefore not be removed.
Sometimes it is more desired to get insight per component. For this the tool Diagraphica
(Pretorius and van Wijk 2006) can be used. In Fig. 11 the workflow is projected onto tasks “F1”
and “F2”. The states of the whole graph are projected into the 21 states of “F1”. They are drawn
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s30_F1 s30_F1
s32_F2s32_F2
Fig. 11 State space projected onto tasks “F1” and “F2” using Diagraphica, direction of arches: clock wise
at the top. Within that it is shown how the states are projected into the different states of task
“F2”. Following the arches in a clock wise fashion shows how one can move among the projected
states. These arches generally represent large numbers of transitions. This diagram stresses the
sequential nature of this system. Only if “F1” is in its leftmost state, “F2” can move from state
to state.
7 Evaluation of the Proposed Approach
This section will reflect shortly to what degree the results presented in this paper have been
proven useful in the particular case of Credit Suisse. Concretely, it was required to use EPCs or
something very similar to EPCs to be able to work with already existing business process models.
For organizational and usability reasons it was requested to provide a declarative way to specify
continuity snippets that are simplified as much as possible because they can be combined by the
help of the formal graph technique to more complex ones automatically. Further, it was requested
to show if and how the universe of business continuity processes can be generated in order to
prepare for business continuity simulations and recommendation services later on. Finally, the
evaluation of single business continuity processes was asked for regarding its local and global
process properties.
Based on a simplified real-world loan granting process we were able to show how these requests
can be addressed. Our specified and (partly) implemented proof of concept illustrates how formal
tools based on different but complementary formal techniques of algebraic graph transformation
and process algebra encompassing modal logic can be used in a combined way to automatically
generate business process variants, derive possible continuity processes and result into sound eval-
uations. This setting contrasts conventional software engineering solutions that do not lead to
formal guarantees requested by Credit Suisse. In addition to the above, and because these formal
tools are by nature generic, they provide support for open and evolving families of domain lan-
guages as requested in (Brandt et al. 2009c). Further, this approach is fully compatible with the
idea of reusing the functionality of an upcoming graph transformation engine that is currently
under construction (Braatz and Brandt 2008, 2010) and which will enable the analysis of much
more complex business processes in the near future that therefore have not been presented in the
scope of this paper yet. Our result enables Credit Suisse to ensure that the used processes out
of the generated universe of business continuity processes respect the given local (4-eye principle)
and global (data- and information flow) security requirements. The first case was ensured by graph
constraints supported by the formal technique of algebraic graph transformation. The second case
was checked by model checking techniques of the mCRL2 tool suite. As requested by Credit Su-
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isse, the presented approach build up on top of formal tools to benefit from formal guarantees
that help to ensure security requirements.
8 Related Work
Finally, we like to give some selected pointers into the area of business continuity, enterprise
modeling, business process modeling and business process semantics to show how our work is
related to the work of others and the current industrial practices. We do not claim to link to the
whole variety of available approaches, but like to show the context of our approach discussed from
the point of view of Credit Suisse.
8.1 Business Continuity
The main purpose of business continuity at Credit Suisse is to protect the organization from
all kinds of failures and disasters by keeping the organization, its critical business processes,
operational (Nemzow 1997, Zalewski et al. 2008). Non-integrated continuity plans did not succeed
here (IBM 2006). An overview of known approaches can be found in (Quirchmayr 2004).The main
problem is a lack of preparation as well as unrealistic assumptions (Landry and Koger 2006b).
Today’s continuity plans are often just textual documents that cannot be verified as e.g. by
simulation (Tjoa, Jakoubi, and Quirchmayr 2008) or a resource and data driven analysis (Nigam
and Caswell 2003). However, according to Credit Suisse continuity plans need to be checked for
security, risk and compliance requirements(Quirchmayr 2004, Cha, Juo, Liu, and Chen 2008).
One available solution able to address such questions is the ADEPT system (Reichert and Dadam
1998). In detail, it guarantees the structural correctness of a process model while applying dynamic
changes and in (Rinderle-Ma, Reichert, and Weber 2008) a trace based semantics is given for
general change patterns for which the effect must be precisely defined. Moreover, the ADEPT
system provides an interface for end users to perform general modifications of the process graph
(Dadam and Reichert 2009) and checks data dependencies before performing a transformation.
A context-aware selection of options including preconfigured and checked process variants are
available for the Provop approach presented in (Hallerbach, Bauer, and Reichert 2009), where
users specify the dependencies between the available options by constraints. Further checks for
basic semantic constraints concerning dependencies and mutual exclusions are performed in the
SeaFlows project (Ly, Rinderle, and Dadam 2008). However, our presented approach puts its
emphasis on orthogonal issues. It is built up on top of a holistic framework for organizational
enterprise models and focuses on the integration of formal methods supporting modeling activities
with formal methods supporting analysis activities in a way that is – in principle – usable by the
people in the field. The proposed formal methods show good potential to be fully implemented or
are already implemented as tools.
In order to keep the complexity of the generation of continuity processes in bounds that are
suitable for the application domain and to keep the specification efforts manageable we do not
consider general process transformations. Our generation creates all possible reordering of the
given standard process in combination with possible replacements using the continuity process
snippets, where each snippet handles one particular unavailability of a resource or an actor. General
transformations can be combined with our approach in an orthogonal way. The generated process
continuations for each combination of failures are ensured to be equivalent with respect to the
functional requirements based on the formal notion of permutation equivalence and they conform
to the given local and global side constraints. All dependency constraints are ensured on-the-fly,
which improves the efficiency.
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Currently available approaches are not able to satisfy the requirement of Credit Suisse to use
fully automated formal methods that are used in a declarative and transparent way compatible
with organizational side-constraints like decentralization. Moreover, there is a special need for
simulation and formal verification in order to ensure conformance and to provide validated recom-
mender services. In the Credit Suisse scenario a sufficiently complete set of continuity processes
has to be generated in advance, without user interaction and based on simple continuity snippets
to enable automatic optimizations and case based decisions with the knowledge that the given
side-constraints are ensured.
8.2 Enterprise Modeling
The main purpose of enterprise modeling at Credit Suisse is to support the development and
maintenance of enterprise wide IT systems (Lankhorst 2005). It is therefore implementation-
driven. Here, we claim that organizational models (Sousa, Van Aken, and Rentes 2001) are the
primary object of interest that can be used for implementations or automation later on as some sort
of by-product. That contradicts the practice at the bank. We assume to work with small, simple
and decentralized models (Pereira and Sousa 2004), which can be automatically integrated, and
that do not necessarily match with the wide variety (Giaglis 2001) of paradigms, frameworks
and architectures (Sousa et al. 2001, Lillehagen and Krogstie 2008) that are partly build on big,
complex and centralized organizational models that are integrated right from their beginning
due to a current lack of knowledge in modeling techniques (Camarinha-Matos, Afsarmanesh, and
Ollus 2005). So, here, we like to look at enterprise modeling as a means to properly document the
business model of Credit Suisse, which runs on top of an IT infrastructure that can be owned by
the bank but need not to be managed by it. This implies the need for an open family of domain
languages. For this purpose, we use the formal approach of graph transformation for the abstract
syntax of the models and triple graph grammars for model based interoperability (Brandt et al.
2009b).
8.3 Business Process Modeling
The main purpose of business process modeling at Credit Suisse is automation and evaluation of
compliance (Brandt, Otten, Kreitz, and Bibel. 2010b). It goes along with business object mod-
eling (Caetano, Silva, and Tribolet 2005). The main problems among others are over-engineering
and a lack of specialization of the resulting business process models (Rosemann, Recker, Indulska,
and Green 2006) which is partly caused by a chaos of modeling techniques (Giaglis 2001) that
are applied without any deep theoretical understanding (Camarinha-Matos et al. 2005). In detail,
there is no clear separation of concerns between business and IT processes as well as their sound
integration (Giaglis, Paul, and Serrano 1999). Adaptable formal foundations for any kind of eval-
uation are missing (Zhang and Wang 2006, Wong and Gibbons 2007, Kawakami, Akinaga, Suto,
and Katai 2003) to enable model-checking (Dai, Bai, and Zhao 2007). Model reuse by the help
of reference models and corresponding process configurations as well as an assisted construction
process are not supported (Thomas, Horiuchi, and Tanaka 2006, Gottschalk, Wagemakers, Jansen-
Vullers, van der Aalst, and Rosa 2009, van der Aalst et al. 2008, Bhattacharya, Gerede, Hull, Liu,
and Su 2007). The flexible integration of evolving domain models of different types like processes
and rules as well as their evolving domain languages is not realized (Bo¨rger and Thalheim 2008,
Zaha, Barros, Dumas, and ter Hofstede 2006). Our approach shows good potential to address lots
of these issues by formal techniques based on algebraic graph transformation in an automated or
semi-automated as well as a transparent way. The chosen modeling language of extended EPCs
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was driven by Credit Suisse based on the knowledges and experiences of the domain experts. The
presented formal techniques based on the abstract syntax, however, can be applied to other DSLs
like e.g. BPMN (Object Management Group 2010) as well. In the context of this study, the explicit
modeling of actors within EPCs is a key feature important for process models at Credit Suisse.
8.4 Semantics and Analysis of Business Processes
The semantics and analysis of business processes is often discussed using petri-nets, colored petri-
nets, the pi-calculus, CSP or Z (van der Aalst 1999, Gottschalk, van der Aalst, Jansen-Vullers,
and Verbeek 2008, Puhlmann 2006, Nestmann and Puhlmann 2008, Wong and Gibbons 2008).
However, there are several other semantics available. Up to now, tool overviews for business
processes do not mention the process algebraic tool suites because they are generally not used for
evaluations of functional and non-functional properties of business processes. See for instance the
overview of Jansen-Vullers and Netjes (Jansen-Vullers and Netjes 2006). However, we believe that
classical data enlarged process algebras such as mCRL2 are certainly as suitable for modelling
and analysis of business processes.
9 Conclusion: Summary and Future Work
Our approach presents how fully automated formal methods can be transparently used by people
at Credit Suisse to model continuity plans that consists of business process models and their corre-
sponding continuity snippets. In detail, we claim that business processes should be administrated
as evolving domain models by the help of their corresponding domain languages. Implemented for-
mal generation techniques create the whole set of possible process variants as well as all possible
continuity processes that respect given side-constraints. By transforming such human-centric pro-
cess models into machine-centric process models fully implemented formal methods like mCRL2
can be used to evaluate the data- and information-flow of a process fully transparent to the people
in the field as it was requested by the management of the bank. By using algebraic graph trans-
formation as a formal technique for model transformation, integration and synchronization as well
as construction we are able to work with small declarative rules, which support the encoding of
decentralized knowledge about enterprise models and the underlying modeling process in a way
that ideally fits organizational requirements of the bank. From the specific point of view of busi-
ness continuity the integration of our approach into an overall framework for enterprise modeling
enables large scale reuse of organizational models as well as consistency checks between models.
Future work will encompass the development of small domain languages for services, processes
and rules that can smoothly be integrated by techniques of algebraic graph transformation and
integrated with purposeful machine-centric models in a transparent way.
References
Y. Asnar and P. Giorgini. Analyzing business continuity through a multi-layers model. In BPM ’08: Proc. of the Int. Conf.
on Business Process Management, pages 212–227. Springer, 2008.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stan-
dards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version, 2006. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm.
K. Bhattacharya, C. E. Gerede, R. Hull, R. Liu, and J. Su. Towards formal analysis of artifact-centric business process
models. In G. Alonso, P. Dadam, and M. Rosemann, editors, Proc. Int. Conf. on Business Process Management (BPM’07),
volume 4714 of LNCS, pages 288–304. Springer, 2007.
E. Biermann, C. Ermel, L. Lambers, U. Prange, and G. Taentzer. Introduction to AGG and EMF Tiger by Modeling a
Conference Scheduling System. Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2010. To appear.
W. Boehmer. Survivability and business continuity management system according to bs 25999. In SECURWARE ’09:
Proceedings of the 2009 Third International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies,
pages 142–147. IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
18 Christoph Brandt et al.
W. Boehmer, C. Brandt, and J. F. Groote. Evaluation of a business continuity plan using process algebra and modal logic.
In IEEE Toronto International Conference on Science and Technology for Humanity (IEEE-TIC-STH), SIASP 2, pages
147–152. IEEE, IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
E. Bo¨rger and B. Thalheim. A method for verifiable and validatable business process modeling. Advances in Software
Engineering, pages 59–115, 2008.
B. Braatz and C. Brandt. Graph transformations for the resource description framework. ECEASST, 10, 2008.
B. Braatz and C. Brandt. How to modify on the semantic web? - a web application architecture for algebraic graph
transformations on rdf. In 2nd International Workshop on Semantic Inforamtion Management – SWIM at ICWE 2010,
2010.
C. Brandt, F. Hermann, and T. Engel. Modeling and reconfiguration of critical business processes for the purpose of a busi-
ness continuity management respecting security, risk and compliance requirements at credit suisse using algebraic graph
transformation. In Enterprise Distributed Object Computing Conference Workshops, Proc. Int. Workshop on Dynamic
and Declarative Business Processes (DDBP’09), pages 64 –71. IEEE Xplore Digital Library, 2009a.
C. Brandt, F. Hermann, and T. Engel. Security and Consistency of IT and Business Models at Credit Suisse realized by
Graph Constraints, Transformation and Integration using Algebraic Graph Theory. In Enterprise, Business-Process and
Information Systems Modeling, Proc. Int. Conf. on Exploring Modeling Methods in Systems Analysis and Design 2009
(EMMSAD’09), volume 29 of LNBIP, pages 339–352, Heidelberg, 2009b. Springer Verlag.
C. Brandt, F. Hermann, and T. Engel. Security and consistency of it and business models at credit suisse realized by
graph constraints, transformation and integration using algebraic graph theory. In T. A. Halpin, J. Krogstie, S. Nurcan,
E. Proper, R. Schmidt, P. Soffer, and R. Ukor, editors, BMMDS/EMMSAD, volume 29 of Lecture Notes in Business
Information Processing, pages 339–352. Springer, 2009c.
C. Brandt, F. Hermann, and J. F. Groote. Modeling and Reconfiguration of critical Business Processes for the purpose of a
Business Continuity Management respecting Security, Risk and Compliance requirements at Credit Suisse using Algebraic
Graph Transformation: Long Version. Technical Report 2010-11, Technische Universita¨t Berlin,Fakulta¨t IV, 2010a. To
appear, online: http://www.tfs.cs.tu-berlin.de/publikationen/Papers10/BHE10.pdf.
C. Brandt, J. Otten, C. Kreitz, and W. Bibel. Specifying and verifying organizational security properties in first-order logic.
In S. Siegler and N. Wasser, editors, Verification, Induction, Termination Analysis, LNCS. Springer, 2010b. To appear.
A. Caetano, A. R. Silva, and J. Tribolet. Using roles and business objects to model and understand business processes. In
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied computing, SAC ’05, pages 1308–1313. ACM, 2005.
L. M. Camarinha-Matos, H. Afsarmanesh, and M. Ollus, editors. Virtual Organizations. Springer, 2005.
W. Cassel. Assessing business continuity requirements. In Power Engineering Society General Meeting, volume 1, pages
822–823. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
S.-C. Cha, P.-W. Juo, L.-T. Liu, and W.-N. Chen. Riskpatrol: A risk management system considering the integration risk
management with business continuity processes. In Intelligence and Security Informatics, pages 110 – 115. IEEE, 2008.
A. Corradini, F. Hermann, and P. Sobocin´ski. Subobject Transformation Systems. Applied Categorical Structures, 16(3):
389–419, 2008.
P. Dadam and M. Reichert. The adept project: a decade of research and development for robust and flexible process support.
Computer Science - R&D, 23(2):81–97, 2009.
G. Dai, X. Bai, and C. Zhao. A framework for model checking web service compositions based on bpel4ws. In S. C. Cheung,
Y. Li, K.-M. Chao, M. Younas, and J.-Y. Chung, editors, ICEBE, pages 165–172. IEEE Computer Society, 2007.
H. Ehrig, C. Ermel, F. Hermann, and U. Prange. On-the-Fly Construction, Correctness and Completeness of Model Transfor-
mationsbased on Triple Graph Grammars. In A. Schu¨rr and B. Selic, editors, ACM/IEEE 12th International Conference
on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems (MODELS’09), volume 5795 of LNCS, pages 241–255. Springer,
2009.
G. M. Giaglis. A Taxonomy of Business Process Modeling and Information Systems Modeling Techniques. International
Journal of Flexible Manufacturing Systems, 13(2):209–228, 2001.
G. M. Giaglis, R. J. Paul, and A. Serrano. Reconciliation of business and systems modelling via discrete event simulation.
In WSC ’99: Proceedings of the 31st conference on Winter simulation, pages 1403–1409. ACM, 1999.
F. Gottschalk, W. M. P. van der Aalst, M. H. Jansen-Vullers, and H. M. W. Verbeek. Protos2cpn: using colored petri nets
for configuring and testing business processes. STTT, 10(1):95–110, 2008.
F. Gottschalk, T. A. C. Wagemakers, M. H. Jansen-Vullers, W. M. P. van der Aalst, and M. L. Rosa. Configurable process
models: Experiences from a municipality case study. In P. van Eck, J. Gordijn, and R. Wieringa, editors, CAiSE, volume
5565 of LNCS, pages 486–500. Springer, 2009.
J. F. Groote, A. Mathijssen, M. A. Reniers, Y. S. Usenko, and M. van Weerdenburg. Analysis of Distributed Systems with
mCRL2, chapter 4, pages 99–128 (www.mcrl2.org). 2008.
A. Hallerbach, T. Bauer, and M. Reichert. Guaranteeing soundness of configurable process variants in provop. In B. Hofreiter
and H. Werthner, editors, Proc. IEEE Conf. on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, (CEC’09), pages 98–105. IEEE
Computer Society, 2009.
R. W. Helms, S. Van Oorschot, J. Herweijer, and M. Plas. An integral it continuity framework for undisrupted business
operations. In Proc. Int. Conf. on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES’06), pages 240–244. IEEE Computer
Society, 2006.
F. Hermann, A. Corradini, H. Ehrig, and B. Ko¨nig. Efficient Analysis of Permutation Equivalence of Graph Derivations
Based on Petri Nets. In J. Ku¨ster and E. Tuosto, editors, Proc. Workshop on Graph Transformation and Visual Modeling
Techniques (GT-VMT’10). EC-EASST, 2010. To appear.
Generation and Evaluation of Business Continuity Processes 19
IBM. Panic slowley. integrated disaster response and bulit-in business continuity, 2006. http://www.ibm.com/itsolutions/
uk/governance/businesscontinuity/.
M. Jansen-Vullers and M. Netjes. Business process simulation - a tool survey. In K. Jensen (ed.). Seventh Workshop and
Tutorial on the Practical Use of Coloured Petri Nets and the CPN Tools (CPN’ 06), Volume 579 of DAIMI, pp. 77-96.
University of Arhus, Denmark, 2006.
H. Kawakami, R. Akinaga, H. Suto, and O. Katai. Translating novelty of business model into terms of modal logics. In
T. D. Gedeon and L. C. C. Fung, editors, Australian Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 2903 of LNCS, pages
821–832. Springer, 2003.
R. J. Kepenach. Business continuity plan design. In ICIMP ’07: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on
Internet Monitoring and Protection, page 27. IEEE Computer Society, 2007.
W. Lam. Ensuring business continuity. IT Professional, 4:19–25, 2002.
B. J. L. Landry and M. S. Koger. Dispelling 10 common disaster recovery myths: Lessons learned from hurricane katrina
and other disasters. J. Educ. Resour. Comput., 6(4):6, 2006a.
B. J. L. Landry and M. S. Koger. Dispelling 10 common disaster recovery myths: Lessons learned from hurricane katrina
and other disasters. J. Educ. Resour. Comput., 6(4):6, 2006b.
M. Lankhorst. Enterprise Architecture at Work. Modelling, Communication and Analysis. Springer, 2005.
F. Lillehagen and J. Krogstie. State of the Art of Enterprise Modeling. In Active Knowledge Modeling of Enterprises, pages
91–127. Springer, 2008.
L. T. Ly, S. Rinderle, and P. Dadam. Integration and verification of semantic constraints in adaptive process management
systems. Data Knowl. Eng., 64(1):3–23, 2008.
M. Nemzow. Business continuity planning. Int. J. Netw. Manag., 7(3):127–136, 1997.
U. Nestmann and F. Puhlmann. Business Process Secification and Analysis, chapter 5. Chapman & Hall/CRC (ed)
Alexander, Michael and Gardner, William, 2008.
A. Nigam and N. S. Caswell. Business artifacts: An approach to operational specification. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3),
2003.
Object Management Group. Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), 2010. formal/10-06-05, http://www.omg.
org/spec/BPMN/2.0.
C. M. Pereira and P. Sousa. A method to define an Enterprise Architecture using the Zachman Framework. In Proc. ACM
symposium on Applied Computing (SAC’04), pages 1366–1371, New York, NY, USA, 2004. ACM.
A. Pretorius and J. van Wijk. Visual analysis of multivariate state transition graphs. In IEEE Transactions on Visualization
and Computer Graphics vol. 12, no. 5, pages 685–692, 2006.
F. Puhlmann. Why do we actually need the pi-calculus for business process management? In H. C. M. Witold Abramowicz,
editor, 9th International Conference on Business Information Systems (BIS 2006), pages 77–89. Department of Informa-
tion Systems, Poznan´ University of Economics, 2006.
G. Quirchmayr. Survivability and business continuity management. In Proc. of the 2nd WS on Australasian informa-
tion security, Data Mining and Web Intelligence, and Software Internationalisation (ACSW Frontiers ’04), pages 3–6.
Australian Computer Society, Inc., 2004.
M. Reichert and P. Dadam. ADEPT flex -supporting dynamic changes of workflows without losing control. Journal of
Intelligent Information Systems, 10(2):93–129, 1998.
S. Rinderle-Ma, M. Reichert, and B. Weber. On the formal semantics of change patterns in process-aware information
systems. In Q. Li, S. Spaccapietra, E. S. K. Yu, and A. Olive´, editors, Proc. Int. Conf. on Conceptual Modeling (ER’08),
volume 5231 of LNCS, pages 279–293. Springer, 2008.
M. Rosemann, J. Recker, M. Indulska, and P. Green. A study of the evolution of the representational capabilities of process
modeling grammars. In E. Dubois and K. Pohl, editors, CAiSE, volume 4001 of LNCS, pages 447–461. Springer, 2006.
A.-W. Scheer, editor. ARIS-Modellierungs-Methoden, Metamodelle, Anwendungen. Springer, 2001.
A. Schu¨rr. Specification of Graph Translators with Triple Graph Grammars. In G. Tinhofer, editor, Proc. Int. Workshop
on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science (WG’94), volume 903 of LNCS, pages 151–163. Springer, 1994.
G. Sousa, E. Van Aken, and A. Rentes. Using enterprise modeling to facilitate knowledge management in organizational
transformation efforts. Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology. IEEE., 1:62,
2001.
C. Stych and K. Zeppenfeld. ITIL, 2008.
O. Thomas, M. Horiuchi, and M. Tanaka. Towards a reference model management system for business engineering. In
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing, SAC ’06, pages 1524–1531. ACM, 2006.
Tiger Project Team. EMF Tiger, 2009. http://tfs.cs.tu-berlin.de/emftrans.
S. Tjoa, S. Jakoubi, and G. Quirchmayr. Enhancing business impact analysis and risk assessment applying a risk-aware busi-
ness process modeling and simulation methodology. In ARES ’08: Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security, pages 179–186, Washington, DC, USA, 2008. IEEE Computer Society.
United States Code. Sarbanes-oxley act of 2002, pl 107-204, 116 stat 745. Codified in Sections 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 USC,
2002.
W. M. P. van der Aalst. Formalization and verification of event-driven process chains. Information and Software Technology,
41(10):639–650, 1999.
W. M. P. van der Aalst, M. Dumas, F. Gottschalk, A. H. M. ter Hofstede, M. L. Rosa, and J. Mendling. Correctness-
preserving configuration of business process models. In J. L. Fiadeiro and P. Inverardi, editors, FASE, volume 4961 of
LNCS, pages 46–61. Springer, 2008.
20 Christoph Brandt et al.
S. Y.-H. C. Wan. Adoption of business continuity planning processes in it service management. In 3rd IEEE/IFIP Interna-
tional Workshop on Business-driven IT Management, pages 21–30, Salvador, 2008. IEEE Computer Society.
P. Y. H. Wong and J. Gibbons. A process-algebraic approach to workflow specification and refinement. In M. Lumpe and
W. Vanderperren, editors, Software Composition, volume 4829 of LNCS, pages 51–65. Springer, 2007.
P. Y. H. Wong and J. Gibbons. A process semantics for bpmn. In S. Liu, T. S. E. Maibaum, and K. Araki, editors, ICFEM,
volume 5256 of LNCS, pages 355–374. Springer, 2008.
J. M. Zaha, A. P. Barros, M. Dumas, and A. H. M. ter Hofstede. Let’s dance: A language for service behavior modeling. In
R. Meersman and Z. Tari, editors, OTM Conferences (1), volume 4275 of LNCS, pages 145–162. Springer, 2006.
A. Zalewski, P. Sztandera, M. Ludzia, and M. Zalewski. Modeling and analyzing disaster recovery plans as business processes.
In SAFECOMP ’08: Proc. Int. Conf. on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, volume 5219 of LNCS, pages 113–125.
Springer, 2008.
E. Zambon, D. Bolzoni, S. Etalle, and M. Salvato. A model supporting business continuity auditing and planning in
information systems. In ICIMP ’07: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Internet Monitoring and
Protection, page 33. IEEE Computer Society, 2007.
J. Zhang and H. Wang. A pi-calculus-based business process formal design method. In W. Shen, J. Luo, Z. Lin, J.-P. A.
Barthe`s, and Q. Hao, editors, CSCWD (Selected Papers), volume 4402 of LNCS, pages 347–356. Springer, 2006.
